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Xuetong,  Yan.  Leadership  and  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Great  Power.  Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2019. xxi + 260 pages. Paperback, $29.95.
In his book, Xuetong Yan utilizes political leadership as an independent variable
to explain the rise and fall of great powers in the world. He attempts to build a theory of
international relations focusing on world power struggles and dominance. Practically, he
tries  to  explore  how China  as  a  rising  state,  one  that  has  significantly  less  material
capability, to surpass US, the current dominating state, to become the new world leader in
the next decade or so. Obviously, this is a very challenging job, not only for him but also
for anyone who studies international relations.  
The  book  is  divided  into  nine  chapters.  In  chapter  one,  Yan  defines  some
important concepts including morality, power, and authority based on what he believes he
can establish as his theory of moral realism. He argues that strategic credibility is the
lowest  level  of  international  morality  and  “high  strategic  credibility  becomes  a
precondition for a leading state to establish international authority.”     
After  briefly  discussing  the  role  of  political  leadership,  Yan  spends  most  of
chapter  two  discussing  the  differences  between  state  leadership  and  international
leadership. Based on different leaders’ attitudes and how they fulfill responsibilities, Yan
places  them  into  four  categories  including  inactive,  conservative,  proactive, and
aggressive. Based on some principles of action and strategic credibility, Yan categorized
four  type  of  international  leaderships  as  humane  authority,  hegemony,  tyranny, and
anemocracy.   
In chapter 3, Yan deduces four corollaries of international change based on his
definitions in previous two chapters. First, improvements and decline of state leadership
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lead  to  changes  in  relative  capability  between  states  and  consequently  change  the
international configuration. Second, all states in an anarchical international system pursue
their own strategical interests with different foreign policies. Third, the states take actions
—including  the  creation  of  international  norms  to  pursue  self-interests.  Fourth,  the
existing international  order  maybe disturbed by the  inherited structural  contradictions
between rising states and dominant states. 
Chapter 4 focuses on changes in an international configuration and shifts of the
world’s power center. Yan points out that it is the current leaderships of both US and
China contributed to the bipolarization of the world power distribution. In addition, he
argues  that  bipolarization  does  not  equal  to  but  could  spark  a  global  cold  war.
Furthermore, he predicts the shift of the global geopolitical center from Europe to Asia in
the near future.   
Yan  explores  the  relationship  between  leadership  and  international  norms  in
Chapter 5. He argues that the leading states tend to promote certain international norms as
their strategy to keep their positions in the international system. He also categorizes four
international  norms including moral  norms, double-standard norms, realpolitik  norms,
and  coward-bully  norms.  In  addition,  he  asserts  that  the  present  international  norms
guided by American liberalist values will remain unchanged forever.  
The key argument  in chapter  6  is  the possible  formation of new international
mainstream values which will guide new international norms. Yan hopes that the new
mainstream  values  will  combine  Chinese  traditional  values  of  benevolence,
righteousness,  and  rites  with  American  liberalist  values  of  equality,  democracy,  and
freedom.  
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Chapter  7  addresses  the  transformation  of  the  international  system.  Yan  first
illustrates the differences between component changes of the system and system change.
Then,  he  explores  conditions  for  system  transformation.  Finally,  he  reiterates  the
importance of leadership in transformation of international system.  
In Chapter 8, Yan uses both ancient Chinese history and modern global cases to
demonstrate  the  transformations  of  the  international  system.  He  differentiates
international orders and international systems as two different entities. Again, he argues
that different types of leadership could determine the direction of the transformation. 
The conclusion presented in Chapter 9 not only provides a bird’s-eye view of the
logics of his theory, but also prediction about future relations between China and US. He
advocates the leadership of humane authority which he believes can make the world more
peaceful.  
Needless  to  say,  Yan’s  work  touches  upon an  important  issue  in  international
relations.  In addition, it is theoretically plausible to use leadership as a single variable to
explain the rise and fall of world power, though the effort will be challenged by students
of institutionalism. Yan is also correct that the bipolarization of power is emerging and
the tension between China and US will shape the world politics in the near future.  
Yet, there are some serious problems with his book; of which I can address three
here  due  to  the  limited  space.   Firstly,  regarding  his  theory,  he  needs  to  be  careful
defining important  concepts  based on which he develops his  theory.  For  instance,  he
writes  on  page  16  that  example  that  highlights  the  difference  between  power  and
authority is the “way in which police officers and medical practitioners change people’s
behavior. The former represents power, the latter authority” and “motorists obey police
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officers  because  police  power  forces  them  to;  patients  take  advice  from  physicians
because of their trust in their medical knowledge.”  This is simply not true because police
officers do have authority,  codified by laws rather than through force.   Yan also uses
those  concepts  carelessly.  For  instance,  he  writes  on  page  16  that  “power  enforces
behavior  through  coercion.”  Then,  on  page  24,  he  writes  that  this  “book  defines
capability as strength and power as influence.” Coercion and influence are not the same.
In addition,  he  writes,  on page 17, that  in  "this  book,  the  concept  of  authority  bears
similarity to Weber’s charismatic authority, but not to the other two types, because it is
defined by followers’ confidence in the qualities of a leadership." Again, this is simply
incorrect. American people might not have confidence in President Trump’s qualities, but
Trump still had the authority that is codified by the Constitution, for example. Further, on
page 37,  Yan writes  the "change of  US president  from a  Democrat  to  Republican  is
another type of regime change." I don't know how many political scientists would agree
with him on his definition of regime change: following his logic, then how many regime
changes took place in China after 1949? What are the differences between the regime
change in 1949 and ones afterwards in China? Without defining those important concepts
clearly and logically, his theory is very likely to become a “Castle of Sand” (to reference
the title of a Japanese movie). 
Secondly, I am afraid to say that it is inappropriate to compare ancient Chinese
tributary  system  with  modern  international  relations.  Under  West  Zhou  Dynasty,
especially during the early period of the dynasty, the relationships between the royal state
and vassals is vertical, not parallel. It is totally different from the modern international
relations.  In  fact,  Yan admits  on  page  76 that  the  “Chinese tributary  system and the
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modern sovereignty system are two different types of international systems.”  
Thirdly, I am troubled by his assertion about the current status of the international
system. On page 203, Yan writes that “it is possible that the Yalta System will continue
through the coming decade without any change of character, just as it did through the
Cold War to the post-Cold War period.” Does the Yalta System still exist? No, it does not.
It ended in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. Clearly, the Yalta System has three
interrelated characteristics including two competing leading powers with two political
camps backed by two competing ideologies. Currently, all we can see is two competing
leading powers.  
Xun Wang, 
Full Professor and Chair 
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